The brics in the global value chains: an empirical note by Chen, Lurong
THE BRICS IN THE GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS:
AN EMPIRICAL NOTE
Lurong Chen1
The ‘BRICs’2 has been an increasingly popular concept in both the public media
and academia. The countries of this group of emerging markets share as common
characteristics large populations, less developed but fast growing economies, and
governments willing to embrace global markets. Quantum changes are predicted
in global economic power, with the BRIC countries gaining progressive impor-
tance and eventually becoming four of the six largest economies in world by 2050
(Wilson and Purushothaman, 2005) .Moreover, buoyed by their rising economic
power, the BRICs states will keep expanding their diplomatic influence and play-
ing more important roles in the international arena both regionally and globally.
Fundamentally, the BRICs phenomenon mirrors a general shift in the international
balance of power, with the centre of gravity moving from the North to the South.
The implications of the rise of the BRICs are certainly large for the world economy,
even if the reality might sensibly differ from the projections conducted by the
analysts at Goldman Sachs (O’Neill, 2007). Whether the forecasts will be met
depends on how the BRICs improve the growth-supportive policy settings, such as
macroeconomic stability, strong and stable political institutions, openness to trade
and foreign direct investment (FDI), and a higher level of education.
1Ph.D. in international relations, with specialization in international economics. Research Fellow,
United Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS),
Bruges (Belgium). E-mail: lchen@cris.unu.edu. Mailing address: UNU-CRIS Potterierei 72,
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2The BRICs is an acronym for the four biggest and most dynamic emerging markets –Brazil, Russia,
India and China.
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It is evident that the rapid growth of the BRICs is supported by the integration of
the domestic markets into the globalizing world economy. External factors, such as
the global economic environment and the performance of foreign markets are also
determinants of the sustainability of their growth. This paper attempts to explore
the interconnections between the BRICs economies and the world economy by
analyzing their key competitiveness and disadvantages in the global value chains.
In addition to the internal economic and political conditions, such global factors
should also be taken into account when drawing the economic blueprint for 2050
and to evaluate the sustainability of their growth performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides facts on the rise
of the BRICs economies and their integration in the world economy. Section 3
evaluates the BRICs countries in the context of global value chains and discusses
their growth potential. Section 4 concludes.
THE INTEGRATION OF THE BRICS IN THE
WORLD ECONOMY
O’Neill (2007) forecasted that the BRICs as a groupwill overtake the G7 economies
in 2032. They will become four of the six most dominant economies in the world;
and the combined nominal GDP will be twice as much as that of the G7 in 2050
(Figure 1).
FIGURE 1.
NOMINAL GDP 2006-2050, THE BRICS VS. G7
Source: O’Neill (2007).
In reality, the BRICs countries grew much faster than that was projected by the
Goldman Sachs economists. Figure 2 shows that the combined GDP of the four
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BRICs states increased from around 3 trillion US dollars in 2001 to 10 trillion
US dollars in 2010. Although they were not immune to the 2007-2009 global
economic crises, the four BRICs states are among those who first moved out of
the shadows of crises and resumed high GDP growth. Compared to advanced
economies that were trapped in recession and are still on the way of slow recovery,
the BRICs have shown their potential to become the main force driving the global
economy in the future. Based on the feedbacks from some 827 business directors
from 61 countries, an IE Business School study (IE Business School, 2011) reveals
that the highest growth rates in 2012 will be found in the BRICs.
FIGURE 2.
ACTUAL GDP VS. PROJECTED GDP OF THE BRICS, 2001-2010
Source. Data of actually GDP sourced from IMF (2011). Data retrieved on 3-Jan-2012.
Data of projected GDP (2003) sourced from Wilson and Purushothaman (2003). Data of
projected GDP (2007) sourced from O’Neill (2007).
Trade and investment liberalization makes it possible for the BRICs to achieve
rapid growth via integrating the domestic economy to the world market. It is
widely accepted that the world today has become increasingly interconnected as
the result of economic, technological, political, sociological, and cultural forces
that keep globalizing the world system (Baldwin, 2006). On December 16 2011,
the WTO officially approved Russia’s membership. All the four BRIC states will
be full member of the WTO by 2012.3
Economically, the BRIC countries are highly connected to the world in terms of
international trade, capital flows, and market interdependence. The BRICs share
as a destination for global FDI, which has been growing substantially in the past
3Following the established procedures, Russia will become an official member after its government
ratifies the related documents by the summer of 2012.
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decade. FDI inflows have accounted for more than 10 per cent of their annual fixed
capital formation. Especially for Russia, in 2009 and 2010, one fifth of the fixed
capital formation sourced from FDI. The combined annual inward FDI flows to
the BRICs in 2010 will almost triple the flows in 2000. According to UNCTAD
(2011) statistics, the BRICs attracted more than $1.5 trillion or about 12 per cent
of world FDI flows during the period from 2000 to 2010. At the end of2010, the
stock of FDI in the BRICs was valued at about $1.7 trillion, almost one-quarter of
that of G7. Meanwhile, the BRICs outward FDI also picked up sharply to reach
more than 4 per cent of the world as more and more companies expand their global
presence. In 2010, more than one-tenth of the world total outward FDI flows were
sourced from the BRICs (Figure 3).
FIGURE 3.
THE BRICS INWARD AND OUTWARD FDI FLOWS, 2000 VS. 2010
Source: UNCTAD (2011). Data retrieved on 3-Jan-2012.
Both the BRICs exports and imports grew substantially as well. Between 2000 and
2010, the BRICs countries together more than doubled their share of world trade.
China accounted for over two-thirds of that growth. In 2010, the BRICs accounted
for over 17 per cent of the world total exports and almost 14 per cent of the world
total imports.
The majority of the BRICs’ trade still occurs with high income economies (HIEs).
Table 1 shows that from 2000 to 2010 the BRICs’ combined trade increased by
over four times. HIEs’ share in the BRICs’ total exports and total imports declined
from 72 per cent to 64 per cent and from 62 per cent to 54 per cent, respectively.
This is compensated by the expansion of trade between the BRICs and low and
middle income economies (LMIEs) during the period. In 2010, over 30 per cent
of the BRICs’ total exports went to LMIEs markets; while one third of its total
imports were sourced from LMIEs.
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TABLE 1.
THE BRICS’ GLOBAL EXPORTS AND IMPORTS
Exports Imports
2000 2010 2000 2010
World (billion USD) 450 2396 361 1986
HIEs (percentage) 0.72 0.64 0.62 0.54
LMIEs (percentage) 0.21 0.31 0.24 0.34
RoW (percentage) 0.07 0.06 0.14 0.12
Notes: country groups based on the World Bank classification.
Data source: The authors’ calculation is based on data retrieved from UN COMTRADE
database via WITS. (Data retrieved on 27-Dec-2011).
All four BRIC governments are net foreign (currency) creditors. They accounted
for almost 40 per cent of the world’s total foreign currency reserves by 2010 (The
World Factbook, 2011)4. China is the dominant contributor, while Russia, India,
and Brazil also accumulated substantial amounts of reserves. With China’s surplus
increasing sharply, the BRICs’ combined current account surplus exceeded $280
billion in 2010 (IMF, 2011).
THE BRICS IN GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS
Globalization after the WWII is associated with the emergence of global value
chains. Technical advances and economic liberalization have significantly lowered
the service cost and internationalized many service activities; and made it possi-
ble to divide the previously integrated production processes into various stages
(Jones and Kierzkowski, 1990, 2001). International sourcing and the spatial di-
vision of sub-stage production processes accelerated the transfer of technology
and facilitated developing countries’ participation into global production sharing
networks. Particularly, the current economic integration is no longer restricted to
OECD countries, but also involves large emerging global players like the BRICs
(OECD, 2007).
Yet engaging in global value chains can facilitate the access to foreign knowledge
and technology and therefore foster economic growth. It will also tie up the do-
mestic and the external market. After achieving rapid economic growth via deeper
integration into the global market, in the long term the sustainability of the BRICs’
growth depends on how they can move up the value chains progressively. It is
therefore necessary to investigate the BRICs’ advantages and limitations in global
value chains.
As globalization increasingly involves cross border goods, capital and services
flows, international trade, and foreign investment become the main channels con-
necting the BRICs economies to the global value chains.
4Data retrieved on 28-11-2011.
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In principle, a country’s economic structure and fundamental competitiveness will
to a great extent be mirrored in its pattern of international goods flows and capital
flows. The degree of trade dependence of the BRICs countries (as measured by the
ratio of total trade to GDP) ranges from 23 per cent (Brazil) to 55 per cent (China)
(The World Bank, 2011)5. Table 2 provides a snapshot of the BRICs’ trade of
goods and services in 2010.
Roughly speaking, Brazil and Russia are dominant suppliers of raw materials;
while India and China are the world’s dominant supplier of services and manu-
factured goods respectively. Except India, who is a net importer of goods but net
exporter of services, all the other BRIC states show a surplus in goods trade and a
deficit in services trade.
The Brazilian economy is characterized mainly by large and well-developed agri-
cultural and mining sectors. It remains primarily a resource-based economy that
is highly geared to international commodity prices. Over 40 per cent of its goods
exports are raw materials, particularly metals such as iron ores and copper ores.
Brazil is a net importer of capital goods and consumer goods. Its major imports
include machinery, chemical products, electrical and transport equipment.
Russia’s industrial sectors contributed almost 40 per cent of its GDP. Raw materi-
als, including metal and energy, accounted for the majority of its total exports. On
the other side, about one-third of Russia’s imports were capital goods, such as ve-
hicles, machinery, and equipment. Russia is the world’s largest exporter of natural
gas and the second largest exporter of oil. Generally speaking, the economic ex-
pansion in Russia in the past decade was mainly driven by energy exports, leaving
the country vulnerable to international oil price fluctuations.
India is the only country among the BRICs that has a trade surplus in services.
By capitalizing on its large pool of low cost, highly skilled, educated ,and fluent
English-speaking population, India has become a major host of offshoring service
activities particularly in IT and business process. At the same time, India is a
leading exporter of gems and jewelry, textiles, engineering goods, chemicals, and
leather manufactures. It is currently heavily dependent on coal and foreign imports
of crude oil for its energy needs. In 2010, one-quarter of India’s imports (in value)
were crude oil.
China’s economy highly depends on international trade. The overall scale of its
trade (either exports or imports) is much larger than the combined scale of the
other three BRICs states. In 2010, about half of China’s goods exports were cap-
ital goods such as electrical machineries and transport equipments. However, the
majority of its trade surplus was indeed generated from its exports of consumer
goods such as household electronic appliances and articles of apparel and clothing
accessories.
5Data retrieved on 23-Dec-2011.
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TABLE 2.
THE BRICS’ TRADE PATTERNS, 2010
Notes: trade of goods and services are the sum of trade in services and trade in goods.
Data source. Data on trade in services retrieved from the World Bank (2011) (Data retrieved
on 21-Dec-2011). Data on trade in goods retrieved from UN COMTRADE database via
WITS. (Data retrieved on 9-Jan-2012).
Meanwhile China is in need of raw materials and intermediate goods such as crude
oil, iron ore, and refined copper to feed its rapid economic growth. China has
become the world’s largest consumer of steel, cement, and copper; and the second
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largest consumer of oil. It accounted for about two-fifths of the growth in global
oil consumption since 2000.
It is also worthwhile to point out that China is not only a world factory of manu-
factures, but also a big supplier and big market of service activities. Indeed, the
scale of China’s trade in services is much larger than that of India.
TABLE 3.
THE BRICS’ COMPETITIVENESS AND LIMITATIONS OF EXPORTS
Country Competitiveness Limitations
Brazil Agriculture and animal prod-
ucts, light industry products,
automobiles and parts, aircrafts.
Integral high technology prod-
ucts
Russia Natural resources: oil, mineral,
iron & steel, lumber.
Overall industrial products
India Primary commodities: miner-
als, teal and cotton; labor-
intensive products: textiles; IT
software
Advanced industrial products
China Labor-intensive products, fabri-
cated products, relatively low-
cost, low-quality products
Integral high technology prod-
ucts, grains
Source: Government of Japan (2010).
The theory of global value chains has highlighted the value-added of different
phases of sub-stage production and services. From the perspective of global pro-
duction sharing, economic growth can be driven by a country’s or a firm’s up-
grading from the relatively lower-valued to the relatively higher-valued activities
(Humphrey, 2004; Brach and Kappel, 2009). At the micro level, the concept of
upgrading refers to product upgrading, process upgrading, intra-chain upgrading,
or inter-chain upgrading (Gereffi et al., 2001); while at the macro level, upgrading
may refer to the transition from low value added (i.e. low skill required, labor in-
tensive stages) to high value added phrases (i.e. high skill required, human-capital
intensive stages).
The in-depth analysis of the export patterns will help us to assess the BRICs’
competitiveness position in the global value chains. This is of relevance because
different export structures have different implications for growth and effects on
domestic industrial development; and they are the outcome of long, cumulative
processes of learning, agglomeration, institution building, and business culture
(Lall, 2000).
This paper will focus on analyzing the factor endowments and the technology ca-
pabilities as they emerge from the evolution of the BRICs’ trade patterns. The
classical Heckscher-Ohlin theory assumes identical production technology and
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shows that a country’s comparative advantage is determined by its factor endow-
ment. Since most developing countries are lacking capital and high-skilled labor
but abundant in low-skilled labor and/or natural resources, they can participate
into global production sharing and find competitive niches in (low-skilled) labor
intensive production activities.
In the long run, however, it is technology that plays the key role in determining
competitiveness. Loosely speaking, higher technology means higher productiv-
ity, and therefore a higher position in the global value chains. For developing
countries, the integration in global production sharing facilitates their access to the
international knowledge pool and allows them to learn, master, and adapt technolo-
gies faster. The patterns of comparative advantage between developing countries
vary according to the different paces of technological learning even if they have
similar factor endowments (Lall, 1992).
Commodity Aggregation System
The commodity trade statistics used for our analysis are drawn from the United Na-
tions COMTRADE database based on SITC Revision 2 classification. We adopt
two commodity aggregation systems to analyse the factor intensity and technology
capability of exports, respectively. The first commodity aggregation system was
developed by Krause (1982, 1987) who categorized commodity exports into four
product groups based on different factor intensities: (a) natural resource intensive
products, (b) unskilled labor intensive products, (c) technology intensive products,
and (d) human capital intensive products. Cheng, Leung, and Ma (2002) further
updated the system and made it compatible with the SITC Revision 2 classifica-
tion.6
The second aggregation system is based on the technological classification as de-
veloped by Hatzichronoglou (1997) and Lall (2000). This classification allows
mapping the technological structure of the BRICs, by classifying the traded goods
in the following categories: (a) primary products, (b) resource-based manufac-
tures, (c) low technology manufactures, (d) medium technology manufactures, and
(e) high technology manufactures.7
Figure 4 shows how the two classifications hang together. As we can see, the
production of natural resource intensive goods involves not only primary products
but also medium-technologymanufactures, while human capital intensive products
also contain resource-based manufactures.
6A full list is given in Appendix I.
7A full list is given in Appendix II.
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FIGURE 4.
FACTOR INTENSITY VERSUS TECHNOLOGY LEVEL OF PRODUCTS
Source: Authors.
Acronyms. PP: primary products. RB: resource-based manufactures. LT: low technology
manufactures. MT: medium technology manufactures. HT: high technology manufactures.
The revealed export competitiveness of the BRICs
We first of all look at the BRICs’ share in the global market as shown in Table 4.
Considering the BRICs as a group, its relative advantage concentrates on exporting
low technology manufactures and unskilled labor intensive products. However, the
export structure of China is quite different from the others. By excluding China
from the group, one can see that their most competitive sectors until 2010 were still
primary products and resource based manufactures. Overall, the exports of Brazil,
Russia, and India were still dominated by natural resource intensive products.
In the case of China, relocation might be the main force behind the exports of
low technology exports. Relatively speaking, low technology manufactures are
more cost-sensitive than medium or high technology manufactures. Because of
this, more and more manufacturing activities with less technology requirements
are moving to China to take the advantage of its large pool of cheap labor. In
the long run, however, the room for further development of exports of low-tech
products is quite limited due to the limited growth of demand and the slow rate of
technical change in these sectors.
Meanwhile, although China has also been achieving substantial market shares in
sophisticated products with high technology requirements, it is widely accepted
that China is mainly specializing in those labor intensive sub-stage processes with-
in the production of medium or high technology manufactures. The domestic con-
tents of China’s exports of technology intensive products are quite limited com-
pared to the four newly industrialized economies (Kierzkowski and Chen, 2009;
Chen and De Lombaerde, 2011).
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The majority of China’s exports are processed exports, and the total imported con-
tent of China’s export products account for over 50 per cent of the final value
(Kwan, 2002). The share of “foreign value added” is even higher in high-tech
products than in low-tech products.
Generally speaking, the BRIC economies are still to be situated at the low value-
added fragments of the global value chains. Their general technological capacity
is quite limited compared to the developed countries in the West. To some extent,
the tendency to move-up in the value chains could be mirrored in the changes in
the export structures. Table 5 shows some structural changes in the patterns of
BRICs exports during the past decade. There are several points to note.
First, all the four BRIC countries have achieved high speed growth in their exports.
The annual growth rate ranges from 14 per cent (in Brazil) to 20 per cent (in
China).This being said, from the perspectives of international trade, the BRICs are
growing at different paces and in different directions.
Second, China’s export structure has undergone big changes within a period of
ten years - the majority of exports shifted from natural resource intensive and un-
skilled labor intensive products in 2000 to technology and human capital intensive
products in 2010. About 60 per cent of China’s exports in 2010 were products
of high or medium technology manufactures. Technology upgrade is also evident
in India’s exports, but not as significant as in the case of China. India’s exports
of technology and human capital intensive products increased by about 7.5 times
between 2000 and 2010, much faster than the growth of exports of goods in any
other category.
Third, structural changes are found in Brazil and Russia’s exports as well, but in
the opposite direction. In both countries, the exports of natural resource intensive
products realized two-digit annual growth rate during the period between 2000
and 2010. The share of natural resource intensive products in Brazil and Russia
increased from 49 per cent and 77 per cent in 2000 to 69 per cent and 89 per cent
in 2010 respectively. However, there are differences between the two countries
concerning the composition of the exports of natural resource intensive products.
In Brazil, exports of resource based manufactures were almost as important as
that of primary products; while in Russia, exports were still dominated by primary
products even though within the exports of natural resource intensive products
the ratio between primary products and resource based manufactures had declined
from 3.1 in 2000 to 2.4 in 2010. Meanwhile, although in both countries the exports
of technology or human capital intensive products have achieved positive growth,
the relative importance of these two groups of products declined significantly; and
so did the exports of high or medium technology manufactures.
Fourth, in India the relative importance of the exports of natural resource inten-
sive products increased as well as that of technology or human capital intensive
products at the cost of the shrinking exports of unskilled labor intensive products.
In 2010, about half of the goods exported by India were categorized as natural
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resource intensive products. Different from Brazil and Russia’s, India’s export-
sof natural resource intensive products were mainly composed of resource based
manufactures rather than of primary products.
TABLE 5.
THE BRICS’ EXPORT STRUCTURES, 2000, 2005, 2010
Country Exports 2000 2005 2010 Ave. growth rate
Brazil 54 116 197 13.8 %
Total (billion $) Natural resource intensive products 49.4 % 55.1 % 68.5 % 17.6 %
Unskilled labor intensive products 6.6 % 4.6 % 2.5 % 3.4 %
Technology intensive products 25.0 % 21.1 % 15.3 % 8.3 %
Human capital intensive products 17.7 % 18.4 % 12.7 % 10.1 %
Primary products 21.1 % 25.9 % 31.6 % 18.5 %
Resource based manufactures 27.5 % 27.4 % 36.8 % 17.2 %
Low technology manufactures 12.3 % 9.9 % 6.0 % 6.0 %
Medium technology manufactures 25.6 % 28.2 % 19.2 % 10.6 %
High technology manufactures 12.8 % 8.2 % 5.5 % 4.6 %
Russia 91 221 355 14.6 %
Total (billion $) Natural resource intensive products 77.3 % 85.4 % 88.5 % 16.1 %
Unskilled labor intensive products 2.6 % 0.8 % 0.9 % 2.5 %
Technology intensive products 11.6 % 7.6 % 6.8 % 8.7 %
Human capital intensive products 8.5 % 6.2 % 3.8 % 5.8 %
Primary products 55.2 % 58.2 % 59.2 % 15.4 %
Resource based manufactures 21.2 % 25.0 % 27.6 % 17.7 %
Low technology manufactures 5.7 % 3.7 % 2.2 % 4.3 %
Medium technology manufactures 13.3 % 11.2 % 9.4 % 10.7 %
High technology manufactures 4.6 % 1.9 % 1.5 % 2.6 %
India 42 99 216 17.9 %
Total (billion $) Natural resource intensive products 40.9 % 44.5 % 48.9 % 20.1 %
Unskilled labor intensive products 27.0 % 17.3 % 13.5 % 10.0 %
Technology intensive products 13.8 % 16.5 % 18.2 % 21.2 %
Human capital intensive products 14.0 % 18.0 % 17.1 % 20.3 %
Primary products 14.5 % 11.5 % 12.5 % 16.2 %
Resource based manufactures 29.4 % 36.4 % 39.5 % 21.5 %
Low technology manufactures 39.5 % 30.2 % 21.1 % 10.8 %
Medium technology manufactures 11.4 % 16.4 % 19.1 % 24.2 %
High technology manufactures 5.2 % 5.5 % 7.6 % 22.4 %
China 249 760 1576 20.3 %
Total (billion $) Natural resource intensive products 14.6 % 11.0 % 8.5 % 13.9 %
Unskilled labor intensive products 36.9 % 26.8 % 26.0 % 16.2 %
Technology intensive products 30.5 % 42.3 % 45.9 % 25.3 %
Human capital intensive products 15.2 % 15.7 % 16.8 % 21.5 %
Primary products 7.3 % 4.4 % 3.3 % 11.0 %
Resource based manufactures 9.0 % 8.4 % 8.1 % 19.1 %
Low technology manufactures 41.3 % 31.6 % 29.4 % 16.2 %
Medium technology manufactures 19.7 % 22.1 % 24.0 % 22.7 %
High technology manufactures 22.7 % 33.5 % 35.2 % 25.7 %
Source: Authors’ calculation based on UNCOMTRADE data.
Data retrieved on 1-Feb-2012.
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Comparative advantage or disadvantage
The concept of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) has been applied widely to
assess the underlying comparative advantage and disadvantage of an economy. We
use the index of the “export revealed comparative advantage” (XRCA) to identify
the comparative advantage of the BRICs in certain products or product groups.
The XRCA index is defined as the ratio of the share of a country’s exports of a
product in its total exports of all products to the share of the world’s total export
of the same product in the world’s total exports.
Using data for 2010, we calculate XRCA indices for each product (at three-digit
level based on the United Nations SITC rev.2 classification) for the BRICs. We
divide export products into two groups using XCRA=1 as a benchmark to dis-
tinguish between products with relative comparative advantage (XCRA>1) and
products with relative comparative disadvantage (XCRA<1). Over 80 per cent of
the BRIC exports in 2010 were contributed by products with relative comparative
advantages. With regard to export diversification, China has the highest level of
diversification while Russia and Brazil’s are highly concentrated compared to In-
dia and China’s. Russia’s comparative advantages concentrated on 30 out of 236
products; and these products with relative comparative advantages contributed to
90 per cent of its total exports in 2010. During the same period, about one-fourth
of Brazil’s export products corresponded to relative comparative advantages. They
accounted for 75 per cent of Brazil’s total exports.
Table 6 lists each BRIC country’s top ten export products according to compar-
ative advantages (in terms of XRCA) in 2010. It shows the BRICs’ comparative
advantage in natural resource intensive and unskilled labor intensive products.
Brazil’s comparative advantages are mainly based on natural resource intensive
products. It is worthwhile to point out, however, that Brazil’s top exporter of in-
dustrial products is indeed a high technology intensive product - aircraft and asso-
ciated equipments and parts (product code 792). Brazilian aircraft maker Embraer
S.A. is already the third largest commercial aircraft manufacturing in the world
(after Boeing in the US and AirBus in Europe). It is the only emerging markets
enterprise that managed to break into the top ranks of aircraft manufacturing.
Besides its comparative advantages in exporting natural resource intensive prod-
ucts, Russia is also competitive in exporting manufactured fertilizers, which are
classified as a technology intensive product with medium technology requirement.
Three of Russia’s top ten export products are medium technology manufactures.
Russia does also have some comparative advantages in exporting high-tech prod-
ucts, particularly other power generating machinery and parts (product code 718),
which accounted for over 7 per cent of the world total exports of products in this
category in 2010.
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TABLE 6.
THE EXPORT REVEALED COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES, 2010
Prod. Code XRCA By Factor Intensity By Technology
Brazil 61 24.4 Natural resource intensive Resource based
281 18.3 Natural resource intensive Resource based
121 16.7 Natural resource intensive Primary products
71 14.3 Natural resource intensive Primary products
222 13.7 Natural resource intensive Primary products
11 8.5 Natural resource intensive Primary products
14 7.7 Natural resource intensive Resource based
251 7.2 Natural resource intensive Resource based
44 6.1 Natural resource intensive Primary products
671 5.9 Natural resource intensive Medium technology
Russia 683 10.6 Natural resource intensive Primary products
341 7.9 Natural resource intensive Primary products
247 6.8 Natural resource intensive Resource based
333 6.1 Natural resource intensive Primary products
562 5.4 Technology intensive Medium technology
672 4.7 Natural resource intensive Medium technology
334 4.2 Natural resource intensive Resource based
233 3.9 Natural resource intensive Resource based
671 3.8 Natural resource intensive Medium technology
248 3.4 Natural resource intensive Resource based
India 264 28.2 Natural resource intensive Resource based
667 15.6 Natural resource intensive Resource based
263 12.8 Natural resource intensive Primary products
75 10.6 Natural resource intensive Primary products
42 8.7 Natural resource intensive Primary products
897 8.5 Human capital intensive Low technology
74 7.0 Natural resource intensive Primary products
531 6.4 Human capital intensive Resource based
651 6.2 Unskilled labor intensive Low technology
659 5.6 Unskilled labor intensive Low technology
China 261 6.8 Natural resource intensive Primary products
666 4.5 Unskilled labor intensive Low technology
831 4.4 Unskilled labor intensive Low technology
845 4.3 Unskilled labor intensive Low technology
752 4.2 Technology intensive High technology
658 3.9 Unskilled labor intensive Low technology
851 3.6 Unskilled labor intensive Low technology
894 3.6 Unskilled labor intensive Low technology
652 3.6 Unskilled labor intensive Low technology
751 3.5 Technology intensive High technology
Source: Authors’ calculation based on UNCOMTRADE data.
Data retrieved on 1-Feb-2012.
India is the only economy of the BRICs that has human capital intensive products
among its top ten export products. However, the technology contents of these
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products are quite limited –products 897 are low technology manufactures while
products 531 are resource based manufactures. Even though the overall share of
high technology manufactures in India’s total exports is higher than that in Brazil
or Russia, there is no sign that India has comparative advantages in exporting high
technology manufactures when examining each individual product at the three-
digit level.
Seven of China’s top ten most “advantageous” export products are unskilled labor
intensive low technology manufactures. Silk and pottery, two products that China
is traditionally famous for since hundreds of years, are still on top of China’s most
competitive export products. Compared to the other three BRICs, China shows
more comparative advantages for exporting high-tech products. However, as men-
tioned before, it is still risky to say China has a higher technological capacity than
the others.
Behind the mass manufacturing exports of “Made in China” there is indeed “Facto-
ry Asia” that is constructed on a “triangular trading system” where Japan and NIEs
export capital goods and complex intermediate goods to less advanced economies,
such as ASEAN and China, for processing operations (Chen, 2008). The export
sectors in China highly depend on the regional production sharing network. For
example, Kierzkowski and Chen (2009) show that China’s imports of parts and
components significantly influence its exports, and up to 60 per cent of China’s
exports to the U.S. would bear risk if China would not be able to continue to im-
port parts and components.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Generally speaking, the BRIC economies continue in the lower value-added frag-
ments of the global value chains. In the long term, their economic growth might
be constrained by technological capacity.
In the case of Brazil, Russia, and India, primary products and resource based man-
ufactures represent the majority of their exports. The prices of most primary prod-
ucts are mainly manipulated by large multinationals from the advanced economies,
and their influence on prices is still quite limited despite the large market share
they have achieved. This leaves their exports vulnerable to the price changes in the
global markets.
China benefits from foreign supplied intermediate inputs to complement its factor
endowment and strengthen its export capability. But this is not risk-free; China’s
exports face constraints in terms of the demand for final products in the foreign
markets, on the one hand, and in terms of foreign supplies of parts and components
with high-tech contents, on the other hand.
In short, in order for the BRICs to sustain their development in the long run, they
need to focus on improving their technological capacity to move up the value
chains.
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APPENDIX I: COMMODITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM I
Commodity group SITC rev.2 code
Natural resource intensive products 0, 11, 12, 2 (except 266, 267, and 269), 32,
333, 334, 34, 35, 4, 61, 63, 661-663, 667,
671, 672, 68
Unskilled labor intensive products 651-657, 664-666, 793, 81-85, 893-895,
899, 951
Human capital intensive products 53, 55, 62, 64, 673-679, 69, 745, 749, 761,
762, 775, 78, 791, 885, 892, 896, 897, 898
Technology intensive products 5 (except 53 and 55), 71-73, 741-744, 75,
764, 771-774, 776, 778, 792, 87, 881-884
Source: Cheng, Leung, and Ma (2004).
APPENDIX II: COMMODITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM II
Commodity group SITC rev.2 code
Primary products 001, 011, 022, 025, 034, 036, 041-045, 054,
057, 071, 072, 074, 075, 081, 091, 121, 211,
212, 222, 223, 232, 244-246, 261, 263, 268,
271, 273, 274, 277, 278, 291, 292, 322, 333,
341, 681-687.
Resource-based manufactures 012, 014, 023, 024, 035, 037, 046-048, 056,
058, 061, 062, 073, 098, 111, 112, 122,
233, 247, 248, 251, 264, 265, 269, 281, 282,
286-289, 323, 334, 335, 411, 423, 424, 431,
511, 514-516, 522, 523, 531, 532, 551, 592,
621, 625, 628, 633-635, 641, 661-664, 667-
689.
Low technology manufactures 611-613, 642, 651, 652, 654-659, 665, 666,
673-677, 679, 691-697, 699, 821, 831, 842-
848, 851, 893-895, 897-899.
Medium technology manufactures 266, 267, 512, 513, 533, 553, 554, 562, 572,
582-585, 591, 598, 653, 671, 672, 678, 711,
713, 714, 721-728, 736, 737, 741-745, 749,
762, 763, 772, 773, 775, 781-786, 791, 793,
812, 872, 873, 882, 884, 885, 951
High technology manufactures 524, 541, 712, 716, 718, 751, 752, 759, 761,
764, 771, 774, 776, 778, 792, 871, 874, 881
Source: Lall (2000).
